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Abstract
Storing data on an external server with information-theoretic security, while using a key
shorter than the data itself, is impossible. As an alternative, we propose a scheme that achieves
information-theoretically secure tamper evidence: The server is able to obtain information
about the stored data, but not while staying undetected. Moreover, the client only needs to
remember a key whose length is much shorter than the data.
We provide a security proof for our scheme, based on an entropic uncertainty relation, similar
to QKD proofs. Our scheme works if Alice is able to (reversibly) randomise the message to
almost-uniformity with only a short key. By constructing an explicit attack we show that
short-key unconditional tamper evidence cannot be achieved without this randomisability.
1 Introduction
1.1 Delegated Storage
Quantum information processing is markedly different from classical information processing. For
instance, performing a measurement on an unknown quantum state typically destroys state infor-
mation. Furthermore, it is impossible to clone an unknown state by unitary evolution [1]. Such
properties are very interesting for security applications, since they provide a certain amount of
built-in confidentiality, unclonability and tamper-evidence. Quantum physics also features en-
tanglement of subsystems, which allows for feats like teleportation [2, 3] that have no classical
analogue. The laws of quantum physics have been exploited in various security schemes, such as
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) [4, 5, 6], quantum anti-counterfeiting [7], quantum Oblivious
Transfer [8, 9], authentication and encryption of quantum states [10, 11, 12], unclonable encryp-
tion [13], quantum authentication of PUFs [14, 15], and quantum-secured imaging [16], to name
a few. For a recent overview of quantum-cryptographic schemes we refer to [17].
In this paper we look at the problem of Delegated Storage. Alice needs to store a large amount of
data securely, but she does not have enough storage capacity herself. The typical solution is to
encrypt the data and then store it on a remote (‘cloud’) server Eve. Since Alice has to remember the
encryption key, this key is necessarily smaller than the data (otherwise Alice could have just stored
the data herself). It is well known that information-theoretic security is possible only when the
key is at least as large as the entropy of the data. Hence it is obvious that in Delegated Storage the
confidentiality of the data cannot be guaranteed unconditionally, not even using quantum physics.
A computationally unbounded Eve will always be able to extract information about the data from
the (quantum) ciphertext.
We show that, somewhat surprisingly, it is possible in Delegated Storage to get information-
theoretic guarantees for a security property other than confidentiality: tamper evidence (tampering
detection). We present a quantum Delegated Storage scheme for classical data which makes it
impossible for Eve to learn anything about Alice’s data without alerting Alice, even if Eve has
unbounded powers of (quantum) computation, measurement, storage etc. Our scheme is close
in spirit to QKD, and in fact it is useful to imagine Delegated Storage as a sort of QKD where
Bob is ‘future Alice’ who retrieves and decrypts the stored cipherstate, and storage on the server
corresponds to travelling qubits. There are some subtle differences with QKD, however, namely
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(i) the short encryption key, (ii) the availability of the ciphertext at the moment when Eve attacks
the qubits, and (iii) Bob’s inability to send any message to Alice. These subtle differences conspire
to necessitate a security proof that differs nontrivially from QKD security proofs, though many
well known ingredients can be re-used.
1.2 Related work
Several works have appeared on the topic of provable deletion of remotely stored data. Coiteux-Roy
and Wolf [18] introduced the task of Delegated Storage and provable deletion with a short-key
requirement for both tasks. However, they did not settle the question whether unconditional
tamper evidence is achievable. Independently, Broadbent and Islam [19] achieved information-
theoretic security for provable deletion using keys that are as long as the message.
Lu¨tkenhaus, Marwah and Touchette [20] use a form of Delegated Storage to store a fully-randomised
bit commitment on temporarily trusted servers, with the possibility of recall. They don’t require
a short key in their definition and use a key as long as the message in their protocol.
The verification process in Delegated Storage involves the measurement of a quantum state by the
verifier; the prover has to send this quantum state to the verifier. This is different from Provable
Deletion protocols and from Molina, Vidick and Watrous’s tickets variant [21] of Wiesner’s quan-
tum money, where the stored data is quantum but the communication between the prover and the
verifier is classical during the verification phase.
1.3 Contributions and outline
• We define Correctness, Security and Usefulness for Delegated Storage. Correctness means that,
in case of low disturbance of the stored quantum states, Alice should not get alerted and should
be able to recover the message. Security means that Eve cannot learn a non-negligible amount
of information about the stored message without alerting Alice. (This definition does allow Eve
to learn the full message while alarming Alice.) Usefulness means that Alice’s locally stored
data is smaller than the remotely stored message.
• We present Can’tTouchThis, our Delegated Storage scheme. As a first step Alice derives, in
a reversible way, an almost-uniform string m from the message µ. Our scheme requires that
this randomisation step is possible without the introduction of long keys; hence the entropy of µ
must be sufficiently high to allow for using an extractor, or Alice must know the distribution
of µ with sufficient accuracy in order to apply compression-based randomisation techniques.
Then, Alice extracts a one-time pad from a random string x; the x is encoded into qubits. She
computes a ciphertext by masking m with the one-time pad. She stores the ciphertext and the
qubits on the server. In between the qubits that contain x there are ‘trap’ qubits in random
positions. When Alice recovers the stored data, she inspects these trap states to see if they
have changed.
• We prove that our scheme satisfies the Correctness and Security properties. If ` is the message
length, then asymptotically n = `1−h(β) qubits are required
1, and Alice has to remember a
syndrome of (asymptotic) size ` h(β)1−h(β) ; the syndrome is the main ‘key’ that she has to store
locally. Can’tTouchThis allows the message to be longer than the key only when 1−2h(β) >
0. This inequality is familiar in Quantum Key Distribution, where it represents the condition
for having positive key rate without two-way communication.
• We propose a method for recursively applying Can’tTouchThis. The syndrome is not stored
locally, but using Can’tTouchThis. The effect is that Alice has to remember a shorter key;
asymptotically the number of qubits stored on the server is n → `1−2h(β) . This expression too
is familiar from QKD, where it stands for the number of qubits required to generate a key of
length `.
1 β is the tolerated bit error rate in the traps. h is the binary entropy function.
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• Our scheme needs a preprocessing step to reversibly transform the message µ into an almost-
uniform string m which then serves as the ‘message’ in the quantum part of the protocol. We
show that this need for a uniform input is not a deficiency of our scheme or our proof technique,
but in fact a fundamental requirement. We introduce an attack called Support which tries to
determine one bit: whether the plaintext is the one with the highest a-priori probability. We
consider delegated storage in general without preprocessing and lowerbound the advantage that
Support yields as a function of the key length and the min-entropy of the plaintext. This lower
bound serves as a kind of ‘no go’ theorem: In the case of a low min-entropy distribution that
is not known to Alice, our bound implies that the Security property cannot be achieved with a
short key.
• We propose two ways in which to achieve a reduced form of tamper evidence in case of the
‘no go’ situation mentioned above. (i) Introducing a temporary computational assumption;
(ii) secret sharing over multiple servers, with the temporary assumption that they are not all
colluding.
The outline is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce notation and list useful definitions and lemmas.
The security definition is given in Section 3. In Section 4 we describe Can’tTouchThis, and in
Section 5 we do the security analysis. Section 6 discusses parameter settings and the recursive
scheme. In Section 7 we prove the ‘no go’ result for low-minentropy distributions that are not
known to Alice. In Section 8 we discuss alternative scheme constructions and weaker schemes in
the ‘no go’ situation.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation and terminology
Sets are written in calligraphic font. Classical Random Variables (RVs) are denoted with capital
letters, and their realisations with lowercase letters. The expectation with respect to X is denoted
as Ex f(x) =
∑
x∈X Pr[X = x]f(x). The notation X ∼ P means that X has distribution P . We
then write P (x) = Pr[X = x]. The statistical distance between two RVs X,Y ∈ X , with X ∼ P
and Y ∼ Q, is given by ∆(X,Y ) = 12
∑
x∈X |P (x)−Q(x)|.
Bitwise XOR of binary strings is written as ‘⊕’. For the first ` bits of the string s we write s[1:`].
The Hamming weight of s is denoted as |s|. The notation ‘log’ stands for the logarithm with
base 2. The function h is the binary entropy function h(p) = p log 1p + (1− p) log 11−p .
The Kronecker delta is denoted as δab. We will speak about ‘the bit error rate β of a quantum
channel’. This is defined as the probability that a classical bit x, sent by Alice embedded in a
qubit, arrives at Bob’s side as the flipped value x¯.
For quantum states we use Dirac notation. The notation ‘tr’ stands for trace. H = 1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
is
the Hadamard matrix. Let A be a matrix with eigenvalues λi. The 1-norm of A is written as
‖A‖1 = tr
√
A†A =
∑
i |λi|. The trace norm is ‖A‖tr = 12‖A‖1. Quantum states with non-italic
label ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘E’ indicate the subsystem of Alice/Bob/Eve.
Consider classical variables X,Y and a quantum system under Eve’s control that depends on X
and Y . The combined classical-quantum state is ρXY E = Exy |xy〉〈xy| ⊗ ρExy. The state of a sub-
system is obtained by tracing out all the other subspaces, e.g. ρY E = trXρ
XY E = Ey |y〉〈y| ⊗ ρEy ,
with ρEy = Ex ρ
E
xy. The fully mixed state on Hilbert space HA is denoted as χA.
We define the rate of a quantum communication protocol as the number of message bits commu-
nicated per sent qubit.
2.2 Definitions and lemmas
Definition 2.1 (Re´nyi entropy) Let X be a discrete set. Let X ∈ X be a classical variable.
Let α ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1,∞). The Re´nyi entropy of order α is denoted as Hα(X) and is defined as
Hα(X) =
−1
α− 1 log
∑
x∈X
(Pr[X = x])α. (1)
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Definition 2.2 (Smooth Re´nyi entropy) Let X ∼ P be a discrete classical variable. Let α ∈
(0, 1) ∪ (1,∞). Let ε ≥ 0. The ε-smooth Re´nyi entropy of order α is denoted as Hεα(X) and is
defined as
Hεα(X) = max
Y∼Q, Q∈Bε(P )
Hα(Y ), (2)
where Bε(P ) is a sub-normalised vicinity of P such that for Q ∈ Bε(P ) it holds that ∑x∈X Q(x) ≥
1− ε and ∀x∈X Q(x) ≤ P (x).
Definition 2.3 (Smooth min-entropy) Let ρXE be a state where X is classical. The ε-smooth
min-entropy of X given E is denoted as Hεmin(X|E)ρ and is defined as
Hεmin(X|E)ρ = sup
τ : ‖τ−ρ‖1≤ε
Hmin(X|E)τ . (3)
Definition 2.4 (Smooth max-entropy) Let ρXB be a state where X is classical. The ε-smooth
max-entropy of X given B is denoted as Hεmax(X|B)ρ and is defined as
Hεmax(X|B)ρ = inf
σ: ‖σ−ρ‖1≤ε
Hmax(X|B)σ. (4)
Definition 2.5 (Extractor) Let f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}` be a function. Let R ∈ {0, 1}d
be a uniformly random seed. Let U ∈ {0, 1}` be a uniform RV. The function f is called a (k, ε)-
extractor if
Hmin(X) ≥ k =⇒ ∆
(
f(X,R), U
) ≤ ε. (5)
Definition 2.6 (Strong extractor) Let f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}` be a function. Let R ∈
{0, 1}d be a uniformly random seed. Let U ∈ {0, 1}` be a uniform RV. The function f is called a
(k, ε) strong extractor if
Hmin(X) ≥ k =⇒ ∆
(
Rf(X,R), RU
) ≤ ε. (6)
Definition 2.7 (Quantum-proof strong extractor) Let f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}` be a
function. Let R ∈ {0, 1}d be a uniformly random seed. Let X ∈ {0, 1}n be a classical RV and let
ρXE be a classical-quantum system comprising the classical X entangled with a quantum system
‘E’. Let Z = f(X,R). The function f is called a quantum-proof (k, ε) strong extractor if
Hmin(X|E)ρ ≥ k =⇒
∥∥ρZRE − χZ ⊗ χR ⊗ ρE∥∥
tr
≤ ε. (7)
Definition 2.8 (Universal hash) A family of hash functions F = {f : X → T } is called two-
universal (or universal) if for all distinct pairs x, x′ ∈ X it holds that Prf∈F [f(x) = f(x′)] = 1/|T |.
Here the probability is over random f ∈ F .
A universal hash function is a strong extractor.
Lemma 2.9 (Leftover Hash Lemma [22]) Let X ∈ X be a random variable. Let f : R×X →
{0, 1}` be a universal hash function. Let U ∈ {0, 1}` be a uniform variable. Then
` ≤ max
η∈[0,ε)
[
Hη2(X) + 2− log
1
ε(ε− η)
]
=⇒ ∆(Rf(R,X), RU) ≤ ε. (8)
Definition 2.10 (Pairwise independent hash) A family of hash functions F = {f : X → T }
is called pairwise independent (a.k.a. 2–independent or strongly universal) [23] if for all distinct
pairs x, x′ ∈ X and all pairs y, y′ ∈ T it holds that Prf∈F [f(x) = y ∧ f(x′) = y′] = |T |−2. Here
the probability is over random f ∈ F .
A pairwise independent hash is also a universal hash.
Lemma 2.11 (See [24]) Let F : {0, 1}ν × {0, 1}ν → {0, 1}ν be given by F (w, x) = w · x, where
the multiplication is in GF(2ν). Let ` ≤ ν. Let Φ : {0, 1}ν × {0, 1}ν → {0, 1}` be constructed as
Φ(w, x)
def
= F (w, x)[1 : `], i.e. the first ` bits. Then Φ is a pairwise independent hash.
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Lemma 2.12 (Theorem 1.5 from [25]) For any α ∈ (0, 1), ε > 0 and any integers n, k satisfying
k ≥ log n+ (log 1ε )1+α there exists a quantum-proof (k, ε) strong extractor that gives an output of
length (1− α)k and needs a seed of length O(log nε ).
Lemma 2.13 (Entropic uncertainty relation for BB84 bases) (See [26]) Let ρABE be any
state of the three-partite system ABE, where the subsystem A consists of n qubits. Let X ∈ {0, 1}n
be the outcome of a measurement on A in the standard basis. Let X ′ ∈ {0, 1}n be the outcome of
a measurement on A in the Hadamard basis. Then
Hεmin(X|E)ρ + Hεmax(X ′|B)ρ ≥ n. (9)
Lemma 2.14 (Lemma 6 in [27]) Let z ∈ {0, 1}n+r. Let I ⊂ [n+ r], with |I| = r, be a uniformly
distributed random variable representing a choice of r out of n+ r positions. Then
Pr
[∑
i∈I
zi ≤ rβ ∧
∑
i/∈I
zi ≥ n(β + ν)
]
≤ e−2ν2r nr(n+r)(r+1) . (10)
3 Attacker model and security definition
We adopt the attacker model that is customary in QKD. No information leaks from Alice’s lab,
i.e. there are no side channels. Eve has unlimited (quantum) computational resources and is able
to perform any measurement allowed by theory. All noise on the quantum channel is considered
to be caused by Eve.
Alice draws her message from a certain probability distribution. We will consider three scenarios,
1. Fully randomised. From Eve’s point of view, the message is uniformly distributed.
2. Weakly randomised. From Eve’s point of view, the message is not uniformly distributed.
However, the distribution has certain favourable properties, and Alice has sufficient knowl-
edge of it to construct an almost-uniform string from the message, by using e.g. an extractor
(Lemma 2.9), prefix coding techniques (Section 4.1) or a combination.
3. Non-randomised. None of the above apply.
We will show that Delegated Storage can be achieved in the 1st and 2nd scenario, while for a
special case of the 3rd scenario we will prove a ‘no-go’ theorem.
Security proofs are often given for the EPR-based version of a protocol. We will follow the same
approach. In this section we define, in the EPR setting, what is meant by ‘security’ for a Delegated
Storage protocol.
The semantics.
The classical variables in the protocol can be abstractly grouped as: The message M , the set of
keys K, the data R that Alice has to remember apart from the keys, the transcript T (classical
data stored on the server), the modified transcript T ′ retrieved by Alice, a binary flag Ω ∈ {0, 1}
indicating accept (1) or reject (0), and the reconstructed message Mˆ . The input to the protocol
consists of EPR states and the classical M ,K. The final output is a quantum-classical state
ρMMˆTΩE containing the classical subsystems M , Mˆ , T , T ′, Ω and Eve’s quantum side information.
We denote Eve’s system as ‘E’. The output state can be written as ρMMˆTT
′ΩE = ρMMˆTT
′E
[ω=0] +
ρMMˆTT
′E
[ω=1] , with tr ρ
MMˆTT ′E
[ω=0] = Pr[Ω = 0] and tr ρ
MMˆTT ′E
[ω=1] = Pr[Ω = 1]. Furthermore we write
ρMMˆTT
′E
[ω=0] = Pr[Ω = 0]ρρ
MMˆTT ′E|Ω=0 and similarly for ω = 1.
Correctness.
Correctness consists of two parts. (i) If Eve behaves honestly, then ω = 1 with overwhelming
probability. (ii) If ω = 1 then mˆ = m with overwhelming probability.
Security.
We say that the Delegated Storage protocol is ε-secure if the following statement holds.∥∥∥ρMTT ′E[ω=1] − E
m
|m〉〈m| ⊗ ρTT ′E[ω=1]
∥∥∥
1
≤ ε. (11)
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Eq.(11) can be read as: “If Pr[Ω = 1] is negligible then we are making no demands. If Pr[Ω = 1]
is non-negligible then we demand that M is decoupled from Eve”. Note that security properties
formulated in terms of the 1-norm (or trace norm) are composable with other (sub-)protocols.
Usefulness.
Let the message space be M and the key space K. We define the usefulness parameter U ≤ 1 as
U =
|M| − |K|
|M| . (12)
It represents Alice’s (relative) gain in the amount of data that she has to store locally.
4 Our Delegated Storage protocol Can’tTouchThis
4.1 Design considerations: message randomisation
The potential messages µ that Alice may store come from a message space M. The probability
distribution may be far from uniform on M. We will see later on that our scheme requires the
stored message to be close to uniform, and that near-uniformity is in fact a necessary condition
for Delegated Storage in general. For non-uniform messages one runs into the problem that the
ciphertext, which is visible to Eve when she attacks the quantum state, causes leakage about the
data contained in the qubits.
Alice hence needs to transform µ into an almost-uniform string M while remembering only a
limited amount of information for recovery purposes. She does this in two steps. First she applies
a prefix code to losslessly compress µ. The codeword is padded with random bits so that every
µ ∈M that has nonzero probability of occurring is transformed into a string M0 of fixed length `0.
The `0 depends only on the probability distribution. It is the length of the longest codeword
2 in
the prefix code. The fact that the code is a prefix code ensures that the start of the padding can
be recognized. Hence, the randomisation comes ‘for free’: Alice does not have to remember the
padding bits.
The second step is to apply an invertible strong extractor on M0. (See Lemma 2.11). This maps
M0 ∈ {0, 1}`0 to M ∈ {0, 1}`. If one is willing to tolerate non-uniformity ε0 then, according to
Lemma 2.9, the extractable randomness is
`
def
= max
η∈[0,ε0)
[
Hη2(M0) + 2− log
1
ε0(ε0 − η)
]
. (13)
Alice needs to store locally `0 − ` secret bits in order to later recover M0 from M . Once all this
is in place, Alice applies a Delegated Storage method that can straightforwardly be proven secure
when the message is uniform.
Note that the prefix code method makes sense only if Alice has a reasonably precise knowledge of
the distribution P of µ. The step with the strong extractor requires less knowledge: only a correct
estimate of H2(M0) is required. Such an estimate is feasible e.g. when P is drawn (in a potentially
unknown way) from an ensemble of distributions which each have a known lower bound on the H2
entropy.
An example of prefix coding plus padding is shown below, for a rather extreme distribution. Here
the result M0 is practically uniform, but this will not be the case in general. Example 4.1 shows
that it is sometimes possible to randomise the input very effectively ‘for free’ even when the
H2-entropy is very low; the randomisation succeeds because Alice knows the distribution of µ.
Example 4.1 Consider the following probability distribution on M = {0, 1}L. For one string
µ0 it holds that Pr[µ = µ0] =
1
2 ; all other strings have probability
1/2
2L−1 . This distribution has
Hmin(µ) = 1, collision entropy H2(µ) = 2 + O(2−L) and Shannon entropy H(µ) = L2 + O(1).
2 In some extreme cases, such as Example 4.1, it may happen that `0 is slightly larger than log |M|, in which
case it is not really a compression.
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The prefix code with padding is constructed as follows. A string µ 6= µ0 is encoded as (0||µ) ∈
{0, 1}L+1. The string µ0 is encoded as ‘1’ followed by L random padding bits. The resulting string
M0 ∈ {0, 1}L+1 has the probability distribution
Pr[M0 = (0||x)] = (1− δx,µ0)
1/2
2L − 1 ; Pr[M0 = (1||x)] = 2
−(L+1) (14)
for any x ∈ {0, 1}L. It has min-entropy Hmin(M0) = log(2L − 1) + 1 > L+ 1− 2−L/ ln 2.
4.2 Protocol steps
Setup phase.
Alice chooses ε0 and sets ` according to (13). She chooses values r, λ, β, ν, ε and α, taking care
that the following condition is met,
`
1− α ≥ log
`
(1− α)[1− h(β + ν)] + (log
1
ε
)1+α. (15)
She sets n = `(1−α)[1−h(β+ν)] . She chooses a MAC function Γ : K × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ, and a
quantum-proof strong extractor f : {0, 1}d × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}`. She chooses an Error-Correcting
Code C that is able to deal with error rate β + ν. The ECC message length is κ and the code-
word length is n. We denote the syndrome function as Syn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n−κ, and the
syndrome decoding as SynDec : {0, 1}n−κ → {0, 1}n. Alice has an invertible randomisation func-
tion Compress :M→ {0, 1}`0 . This includes the random padding step. The corresponding inverse
function is Decompress : {0, 1}`0 →M, which includes discarding the padding bits.
Message preparation.
Alice has a message µ ∈M. She performs the following steps.
1. m0 = Compress(µ).
2. Draw random seed w ∈ {0, 1}`0 . Compute p = w ·m0, where the multiplication ‘·’ is in GF(2`0).
Parse p as p = m‖m4, with m ∈ {0, 1}`.
Encryption and storage.
3. Draw random strings ξ, t ∈ {0, 1}n+r with |t| = r. (The string t defines a subset T ⊂ [n+ r] of
size r which points at the trap locations.) Create strings v = ξT (trap values) and x = ξ[n+r]\T
(payload). Prepare the quantum state |Ψ〉 = ⊗n+rj=1 Htj |ξj〉.
4. Draw random seed u ∈ {0, 1}d. Compute syndrome s = Synx, one-time-pad z = f(u, x) and
ciphertext c = m⊕ z.
5. Draw random MAC key η ∈ K. Compute the tag θ = Γ(η, w‖u‖c). Store w, u, c, θ and |Ψ〉 on
the server. Remember η, T , v, s,m4. Forget all other variables.
Testing and decryption.
6. Retrieve classical data w′, u′, c′, θ′ and state |Ψ′〉. Set ω = 0. If θ′ 6= Γ(η, w′‖u′‖c′) then abort.
7. In positions T measure |Ψ′〉 in the Hadamard basis; in all other positions in the standard basis.
The measurement result is v′ ∈ {0, 1}r from the trap locations and x′ ∈ {0, 1}n from the other
locations. If |v′ ⊕ v| > βr then abort.
8. Reconstruct xˆ = x′ ⊕ SynDec(s⊕ Synx′). If SynDec fails then abort, else continue. Set ω = 1.
Compute zˆ = f(u′, xˆ) and mˆ = zˆ ⊕ c′.
9. Compute mˆ0 = (w
′)−1 · (mˆ‖m4) and µˆ = Decompress(mˆ0).
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Notation Meaning
β bit error rate threshold
c classical ciphertext
d seed length for quantum-proof extractor
η MAC key for w, c
f quantum-proof extractor
Γ MAC function
H Hadamard operator
κ ECC message length
` output length of strong extractor
`0 lossless compression length
λ length of authentication tag
m0 compressed message
m output of strong extractor
m4 stored for strong extractor inversion
µ original message
n number of qubits that carry a payload
ω success flag
r number of trap qubits
s syndrome of payload x
Syn syndrome function
t string indicating the trap positions
T set of trap positions
θ tag for w, c
u seed for the quantum-proof extractor
v trap values
w seed for the strong extractor
x payload in the non-trap positions
z classical one-time pad
 
ALICE EVE BOB = FUTURE ALICE
EPR
Random T , u, w, ⌘
Measure x, v
m0 = Compressµ
(mkm4) = w ·m0
s = Synx
z = f(u, x)
c = m  z
✓ =  (⌘, wkc)
w, c, ✓
w0, c0, ✓0
Remember T , v, s, u, ⌘,m2
If ✓0 6=  (⌘, w0kc0) then abort
Measure x0, v0
If |v0   v| >  r then abort
xˆ = x0   SynDec(s  Synx0)
If SynDec fails then abort
zˆ = f(u, xˆ)
mˆ = zˆ   c0
mˆ0 = w
 1 · (mˆkm4)
µˆ = Decompress mˆ0
attack
Figure 2: The EPR version of the Delegated Storage protocol. The double lines represent quantum
states (n+ r qubits).
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states (n+ r qubits).
n+ r qubits
measure
x0 2 {0, 1}n trap
values
ECC + q-proof extractor
zˆ 2 {0, 1}`
 c
mˆ 2 {0, 1}`
invert strong extractor using w,m4
mˆ0 2 {0, 1}`0
Decompress
µˆ 2M
Figure 3: Bla bla.
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Figure 1: Visualisation of the variables and the steps in the reconstruction of the message µ.
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-ALICE EVE BOB = FUTURE ALICE
EPR
Random T , u, w, ⌘
Measure x, v
m0 = Compress(µ)
(mkm4) = w ·m0
s = Synx
z = f(u, x)
c = m  z
✓ =  (⌘, wkukc)
w, u, c, ✓
w0,u0,c0,✓0
Remember T , v, s, ⌘,m4
If ✓0 6=  (⌘, w0ku0kc0) then abort
Measure x0, v0
If |v0   v| >  r then abort
xˆ = x0   SynDec(s  Synx0)
If SynDec fails then abort
zˆ = f(u0, xˆ)
mˆ = zˆ   c0
mˆ0 = w
 1 · (mˆkm4)
µˆ = Decompress(mˆ0)
attack
Figure 3: Bla blar.
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Figure 2: The EPR version of Can’tTouchThis. The double lines represent quantum states
(n+ r qubits).
9
5 Security analysis
5.1 EPR version of the protocol
We present the EPR-pair based version of Can’tTouchThis (Fig.2). Only the differences with
respect to Section 4.2 are listed.
Eve creates n + r EPR-pairs. Of each EPR pair she gives one qubit to Alice and keeps one for
herself. In step 3 of the protocol, instead of preparing a state, Alice now measures her j’th qubit
in the Hadamard basis if j ∈ T , and in the standard basis otherwise. The random string ξ is now
the result of Alice’s measurement.
In step 6 and later, we refer to Alice as ‘Bob’.
5.2 Main result
Theorem 5.1 (Main theorem) Consider the EPR version of Can’tTouchThis as described
in Section 5.1, with parameter values as in Section 4.2. Let the distribution of the message µ and
Alice’s knowledge about this distribution be such such that the length ` in (13) is positive. Let δ
be defined as δ
def
= exp
[
−2ν2r nr(n+r)(r+1)
]
. The protocol satisfies Correctness and is (2 · 2−λ + 2δ+
4ε0 + ε)-Secure as defined in Section 3.
The security of the EPR version implies security of the actual protocol.
Proof of Theorem 5.1.
Correctness.
(i) If Eve behaves honestly then the bitflips in the traps are caused entirely by noise; the parameter
β is chosen such that the number of naturally occurring bitflips does not exceed rβ except with
negligible probability (binomial tail).
(ii) If all tests are passed (ω = 1), then the event mˆ 6= m could occur in a number of ways: (a)
Eve forges a tag. For this the probability is 2−λ, negligible; (b) In the non-trap part there are too
many errors to correct (probability ≤ δ).
Security.
We have to prove that ‖ρMTT ′E[ω=1] − ρM ⊗ ρTT
′E
[ω=1]‖1 ≤ 2 · 2−λ + 2δ + 4ε0 + ε. First we note that
Pr[Ω = 1|T ′ 6= T ]ρ ≤ 2−λ. This allows us to write ‖ρMTT ′E[ω=1] − ρM ⊗ ρTT
′E
[ω=1]‖1 ≤ 2 · 2−λ +
‖ρMTT ′E[ω=1,t′=t] − ρM ⊗ ρTT
′E
[ω=1,t′=t]‖1. Next we write ‖ρMTT
′E
[ω=1,t′=t] − ρM ⊗ ρTT
′E
[ω=1,t′=t]‖1 ≤ ‖ρMMˆTT
′E
[ω=1,t′=t] −
ρMMˆ[ω=1,t′=t]⊗ ρTT
′E
[ω=1,t′=t]‖1. (Taking the Mˆ -trace cannot increase the norm.) We apply Lemma 2.14
to the noise v′ ⊕ v ∈ {0, 1}r in the trap positions and the noise x′ ⊕ x ∈ {0, 1}n in the payload
positions. Lemma 2.14 gives Pr
[|v′ ⊕ v| ≤ rβ ∧ |x′ ⊕ x| > n(β + ν)] ≤ δ. It follows that
Pr[Ω = 1, Mˆ 6= M ] ≤ δ. This allows us to write ‖ρMMˆTT ′E[ω=1,t′=t] − ρMMˆ[ω=1,t′=t] ⊗ ρTT
′E
[ω=1,t′=t]‖1 ≤
2δ + ‖ρMMˆTT ′E[ω=1,t′=t,mˆ=m] − ρMMˆ[ω=1,t′=t,mˆ=m] ⊗ ρTT
′E
[ω=1,t′=t,mˆ=m]‖1. Next we note that, by Lemma 2.9,
the M is ε0 removed from being uniform. If M were uniform, the transcript T (containing the
ciphertext C = M⊕Z) would be statistically decoupled from Z. Hence, the state ρMMˆTT ′E[ω=1,t′=t,mˆ=m] is
ε0-close to a state σ where Z does not depend on T . Given C, the M and Z are equivalent. We can
write ‖ρMMˆTT ′E[ω=1,t′=t,mˆ=m] − ρMMˆ[ω=1,t′=t,mˆ=m] ⊗ ρTT
′E
[ω=1,t′=t,mˆ=m]‖1 ≤ 4ε0 + ‖σZE − χZ ⊗ σE‖1. Finally
we have to show that we satisfy the conditions for the existence of a quantum-proof extractor
(Lemma 2.12), in order to obtain ‖σZE − χZ ⊗ σE‖1 ≤ ε. For this we need a lower bound on the
min-entropy Hmin(X|E)σ. Lemma 2.13 gives Hmin(X|E)σ ≥ n− Hmax(X ′|B)σ. The Hmax(X ′|B)σ
represents the amount of redundancy information that Bob (who shares noisy EPR pairs with
Alice) needs in order to reconstruct a measurement at Alice’s side. For the state σ, which is
conditioned on ω = 1 and mˆ = m, this redundancy can be upper bounded [27] as nh(β+ ν). This
yields Hmin(X|E)σ ≥ n− nh(β + ν). By (15) and the setting of n relative to ` the conditions for
Lemma 2.12 are indeed met. 
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6 Setting the parameters
6.1 Asymptotics
We look at the asymptotic case H2(µ) → ∞. We tune the parameters such that the three terms
4ε0, 2
−λ+1, and 2δ in Theorem 5.1 equal ε, where ε is constant.
Consider setting the number of trap states proportional to n, i.e. r = ζn for constant ζ. This
yields (asymptotically)
2δ → 2e−2nν2 ζ1+ζ . (16)
Hence we may set both ν and ζ to small values, ν2ζ = O( 1n ln 1ε ). With vanishing ν the value of
κ goes to n− nh(β).
How much local storage Alice needs.
The main data item that Alice needs to remember (store locally) is the syndrome s ∈ {0, 1}n−κ.
Asymptotically the size of the syndrome is nh(β) bits, with n→ ` 11−h(β) . The other items are the
constant-size MAC key η, the trap locations set of size log |T | ≈ nh( ζ1+ζ ) ≈ nζ log 1ζ , the nζ trap
values, and the m4 ∈ {0, 1}`0−`.
It is difficult to make general statements about the gap `0 − `. However, for sources like human
language the quality of the compression becomes better with increasing message length; the average
compressed size (without padding) approaches the Shannon entropy, meaning that M0 becomes
more uniform, and the ratio (`0 − `)/`0 becomes smaller. Furthermore, for sources that produce
i.i.d. symbols it is known that asymptotically the smooth Re´nyi entropy approaches the Shannon
entropy, which has an advantageous effect on (13). For these reasons, we expect the overhead
`0 − ` to be sub-linear in log |M|.
Delegated storage has positive Usefulness (see Section 3) only if Alice needs to remember fewer
than roughly ` bits,
`
h(β)
1− h(β) < `, (17)
i.e. when the bit error rate is small enough to satisfy 1 − 2h(β) > 0. This threshold is (perhaps
unsurprisingly) the same as the BB84 threshold for having a positive QKD rate.
6.2 Recursive application of Can’tTouchThis
The nh(β) storage requirement for Alice means that she gains very little from Delegated Storage
at large β. The following method improves that. The storage of the syndrome s itself can be
Delegated using Can’tTouchThis; then Alice has to remember only a fraction h(β)1−h(β) of the
original size. This principle can be applied recursively until (asymptotically) Alice’s local storage
needs are very small compared to `0. The number of stored qubits is then
`
1−h(β) [1 +
h(β)
1−h(β) +
{ h(β)1−h(β)}2 + · · · ] = `1−2h(β) ; this formula is familiar: it is associated with the key rate of (efficient)
QKD, i.e. the number of qubits needed to convey a k0-bit message one-time-pad-encrypted with
a QKD key.
7 Why the message needs to be randomizable
The security proof (Section 5.2) needs the assumption that either the fully randomised or weakly
randomised scenario holds (see Section 3). That leaves the question: Is it impossible in general
to achieve Delegated Storage in the non-randomised scenario, or is it just a quirk of our scheme
and/or our proof method?
7.1 The non-randomised scenario
We consider a scenario where the distribution P of the message is not known to Alice
and is controlled by Eve. This is essentially the setting of Indistinguishability under Chosen
Plaintext Attacks.
11
Alice’s lack of knowledge about P prevents her from applying the prefix-code preprocessing trick,
i.e. any randomisation that she performs comes at the cost of having to remember keys, and hence
becomes part of the encryption procedure.
By explicitly constructing an attack (we call it Support) we demonstrate that, in this scenario,
Delegated Storage with short keys is impossible.
We consider a general protocol, not restricted to the one proposed in Section 4.2. We use the
following notation. The plaintext is a random variable M ∈ M with distribution P . We write
pm
def
= Pr[M = m]. We denote the highest-probability plaintext as m∗, with probability p∗.
Let ρ(m, k) denote the quantum encryption of message m using key k. The ρ(m, k) represents
everything (quantum and classical) that Alice stores on the server, while k is everything that Alice
stores privately. The stored state does not have to be pure. The event that Alice does not notice
disturbance is called acc (‘accept’), and if she notices disturbance rej (‘reject’). We consider only
‘correct’ schemes, i.e. decryption succeeds with certainty when there is no attack.
7.2 The Support Attack
Alice receives m from the distribution P and draws a key k uniformly from K. She creates the
encryption ρ(m, k). Eve’s task is to determine from the encryption whether m == m∗ without
causing a rej. We set some notation:
• For y ∈M we write ρ(¬y, k) def= 11−py
∑
m 6=y pmρ(m, k) and ρ(M, k) def=
∑
m∈M pmρ(m, k).
• For m ∈M, k ∈ K let Πm,k be the projector onto span (ρ(m, k)).
• For m ∈M let Πm,K be the projector onto span
(∑
k∈KΠm,k
)
.
• For k ∈ K let ΠM,k be the projector onto span
(∑
m∈MΠm,k
)
. For the correctness of the
decryption the orthogonality property ΠM,k =
∑
m∈MΠm,k must hold.
• Let IM,K be the (identity) projector onto span
(∑
m∈MΠm,K
)
.
Definition 7.1 The attack Support proceeds as follows: Eve applies, on the quantum state she
receives from Alice, the projective measurement {Πm∗,K, IM,K−Πm∗,K}. If she obtains Πm∗,K,
she guesses m∗; otherwise, she guesses ¬m∗.
The projective measurement is potentially very complex.
7.3 Support breaks the security in the non-randomised scenario
We denote by WIN the event that Eve guesses correctly whether m == m∗.
Lemma 7.2 For m = m∗ the Support attack causes WIN and acc.
Proof: In the case that Alice encrypts m = m∗, no matter the actual key k used, the Support
measurement Πm∗,K leaves the state unchanged and correctly yields the measurement result m∗.

Lemma 7.3 For the overall acc probability we have Pr[acc] ≥ p∗ .
Proof: Pr[acc] = Pr[M = m∗]Pr[acc|M = m∗] + Pr[M 6= m∗]Pr[acc|M 6= m∗] ≥ p∗Pr[acc|M =
m∗] = p∗. 
We introduce the following notation. Let P be a distribution on M, and let pi be a permutation
on M. The permuted distribution is denoted as pi(P ).
Lemma 7.4 Consider the scenario described in Section 7.1. Let P be a distribution onM. There
exists a permutation pi on M such that the Support attack has PrM∼pi(P )[WIN|M 6= m∗] ≥
1− |K||M| .
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Proof: We use maxpi PrM∼pi(P )[WIN|M 6= m∗] ≥ Epi PrM∼pi(P )[WIN|M 6= m∗]. In the derivation
below the effect of Epi is a uniform choice of m∗. For all k ∈ K we have
E
pi
PrM∼pi(P )[WIN|M 6= m∗, k] = 1− 1|M|
∑
m∗∈M
tr Πm∗,K · ρ(¬m∗, k)
= 1− 1|M|
∑
m∗∈M
tr Πm∗,K ·
1
1− p∗
∑
m6=m∗
p∗ρ(m, k)
= 1− 1|M|
∑
m∗∈M
1
1− p∗ [tr Πm∗,K · ρ(M, k)− p∗] (18)
≥ 1− 1|M|
∑
m∗∈M
tr Πm∗,K · ρ(M, k) (19)
≥ 1− 1|M|
∑
m∗∈M
∑
k′
tr Πm∗,k′ · ρ(M, k) (20)
= 1−
∑
k′
1
|M|
∑
m∗∈M
tr Πm∗,k′ · ρ(M, k) (21)
correctness
= 1−
∑
k′
1
|M| tr ΠM,k′ · ρ(M, k) (22)
≥ 1− |K||M| . (23)
The equality (18) follows from the definitions of ρ(M, k), ρ(¬m∗, k) and the fact that tr [Πm∗,K
ρ(m∗, k)] = 1. The inequality (19) follows from tr (· · · ) ≤ 1. We get (20) from span(
∑
k′ Πm∗,k′) ≤∑
k′ Πm∗,k′ . 
Lemma 7.5 Consider the scenario described in Section 7.1. Let P be a distribution onM. There
exists a permutation pi on M such that
PrM∼pi(P )[acc|M 6= m∗] ≤ PrM∼pi(P )[WIN ∧ acc|M 6= m∗] + |K||M| . (24)
Proof: We have Pr[WIN∧acc|M 6= m∗] = Pr[WIN|M 6= m∗]−Pr[WIN∧¬acc|M 6= m∗]. Applying
Lemma 7.4 gives
∃pi PrM∼pi(P )[WIN ∧ acc|M 6= m∗] ≥ 1− |K||M| − PrM∼pi(P )[WIN ∧ ¬acc |M 6= m∗] (25)
≥ 1− |K||M| − PrM∼pi(P )[¬acc|M 6= m∗] (26)
= PrM∼pi(P )[acc|M 6= m∗]− |K||M| . (27)

Proposition 7.6 Consider the scenario described in Section 7.1. Let P be a distribution on M.
There exists a permutation pi on M such that the Support attack has the following advantage in
guessing the bit [m == m∗] correctly while staying unnoticed by Alice.
PrM∼pi(P )[WIN|acc]− p∗ ≥ p∗(1− p∗)(1− |K||M| ). (28)
Proof: We have
Pr[WIN|acc] = Pr[WIN ∧ acc]/Pr[acc] (29)
=
p∗ · Pr[WIN ∧ acc|M = m∗] + (1− p∗) · Pr [WIN ∧ acc|M 6= m∗]
p∗ · Pr[acc|M = m∗] + (1− p∗) · Pr[acc|M 6= m∗] (30)
=
p∗ + (1− p∗) · Pr [WIN ∧ acc|M 6= m∗]
p∗ + (1− p∗) · Pr[acc|M 6= m∗] (31)
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Note that Pr[acc] 6= 0 by Lemma 7.3, allowing the division by Pr[acc] in the first line. Applying
Lemma 7.5 yields
∃pi PrM∼pi(P )[WIN|acc] ≥
p∗ + (1− p∗)PrM∼pi(P ) [WIN ∧ acc|M 6= m∗]
p∗ + (1− p∗){PrM∼pi(P )[WIN ∧ acc|M 6= m∗] + |K||M|}
(32)
≥ p∗
p∗ + (1− p∗) |K||M|
=
p∗
1− (1− p∗)(1− |K||M| )
(33)
≥ p∗ + p∗(1− p∗)(1− |K||M| ). (34)

For the non-randomised scenario, Proposition 7.6 and Lemma 7.3 prove that the security property
(11) cannot be achieved with a short key. Consider a distribution P such that p∗  1/|M|. In
order to make Eve’s advantage (28) negligible it is necessary to make the key length almost equal
to the message length; this negates all the advantages of delegated storage.
Theorem 7.7 For all U > 0 there exists ε > 0 such that there exists no U -useful, ε-secure
Delegated Storage protocol in the non-randomised scenario.
Proof. By Proposition 7.6 the attacker’s advantage is lower bounded by p∗(1 − p∗)U , with U
constant as a function of the message size. In the non-randomised scenario, the attacker controls
p∗, so Alice has no way to reduce the attacker’s advantage below p∗(1 − p∗)U . (E.g. increasing
the message length, which typically improves security, does not help here.) The fixed advantage
does not allow ε to be decreased indefinitely. 
8 Discussion
Various alternative constructions are of course possible. If confidentiality is required in case of a
reject, Alice can classically encrypt the message, before or after randomisation, or as part of the
randomisation. The confidentiality will not be information-theoretic since the encryption key has
to be short.
A different way to improve the reject-case confidentiality is to do secret sharing of the message
between two or more servers. Then the plaintext is compromised only if (i) all the retrievals are
rejects; and (ii) all servers collude.
Encryption can be used for a different purpose as well. Consider the scenario discussed in Section 7,
i.e. Alice is unable to randomise the message µ ‘for free’. Let Alice use a classical cipher F to create
ciphertext ν = Fk(µ), where k is a short key. This gives Alice a benefit: from Eve’s point of view,
the ν temporarily looks random (until Eve breaks F ), enabling Alice to apply Can’tTouchThis
with ν as the message to be stored. Thus, the tamper evidence in this scenario is computational
instead of information-theoretic; still a feat that cannot be accomplished classically. Furthermore,
Eve works under a time limit. She is forced break F before Alice retrieves the data.
Secret sharing over multiple servers can achieve this message-randomisation purpose too, and the
servers only need to be prohibited from colluding during the protocol, because the security granted
by tamper evidence is unaffected by the servers sharing information after the verification phase.
An interesting aspect of our results is that unconditional tamper evidence for the randomised
version of delegated storage does not imply unconditional tamper evidence for its non-randomised
version. In fact, Theorem 5.2 and Theorem 7.7 respectively prove that, given a requirement
of non-zero usefulness for at least some large-enough messages, the former is possible while the
latter is not. In contrast, the security of non-randomised Oblivious Transfer [28] has been shown,
under many sequential composability scenarios [29, 30, 31], to be reducible to the security of
Randomised Oblivious Transfer. Similarly, Quantum Key Distribution has been shown [32] secure
in the universally composable sense: In order to communicate non-random messages, the random
keys that QKD distributes can be securely correlated with subsequent information.
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An interesting extension would be to apply Can’tTouchThis to quantum information. The trap
qubits would work in a similar way; the mask z would become a key for Quantum-One-Time-Pad
encrypting Alice’s quantum information.
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